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Abstract: This paper analyses the design of the EU Profiler, the first truly 
cross-national VAA. We assess the convergent validity and scaling reliability 
of the low-dimensional models that are used to represent differences between 
parties and users. Convergent validity of the party positions in the EU Profiler is 
moderate to high, but scaling reliability is low for most of the issue dimensions 
included. We examine whether these problems are related to the EU Profiler’s 
cross-national nature. The EU Profiler integrates the positions of parties  
from all over Europe into one pan-European model, even though students of 
European politics emphasise that there are structural differences between party 
competition in Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe. We find that 
the EU Profiler performs better in terms of scaling reliability in Western 
European party systems than in Central and Eastern European party systems. In 
addition, there are substantive differences between individual countries.  
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1 Introduction 
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) come in many shapes and sizes. While almost all 
VAAs provide users with statements, there is a large diversity in the way these 
statements are selected, how the voting advice is calculated and the manner in which it is 
presented (Walgrave et al., 2009). Within this broad field, the EU Profiler takes a special 
place. Developed for the 2009 European Parliament elections, this VAA positioned  
274 parties in 30 European countries, making it the first supranational VAA (Trechsel 
and Mair, 2009). This required a remarkable feat in data collection: more than 120 
political scientists from all over Europe coded party positions on a broad range of issues. 
The EU Profiler is not just a tool that voters can use to make informed voting decisions, 
but also a means of data collection for researchers. As a means of comparative party 
research, it is a major contribution to the field of political science. The broad scope of the 
EU Profiler in terms of the number of political systems involved makes the issue of VAA 
design even more pressing than normal. How can it be ensured that the EU Profiler 
provides a valid and reliable advice in each country when we know that there are 
important differences between the party systems of Central and Eastern Europe and 
Western Europe (Grzymała-Busse and Innes, 2003; Marks et al., 2006)? 
Whereas the effect of VAAs on voters has been studied, many aspects of their design 
have remained mostly unexplored (Garzia, 2010; Ladner and Pianzola, 2010; Walgrave 
et al., 2008, Wagner and Ruusuvirta, 2012). Only one published study has tested the 
impact of VAA design choices in a systematic way. That study focuses on the selection 
of statements, a very important concern in VAA design (Walgrave et al., 2009). Many 
other aspects of VAA design have not been extensively discussed in the literature.  
We specifically assess the validity and reliability of one aspect of VAAs, the low-
dimensional spatial models used in the EU Profiler.  
This paper focuses on the EU Profiler, because it is the first truly cross-national VAA 
and because it uses various methods of calculating the vote advice. We assess several 
aspects of the EU Profiler, namely its reliability and validity and analyse whether the 
design problems we identify are related to its cross-national nature. The EU Profilers’ 
models attempt to integrate the positions of parties from all over Europe into one pan-
European model, even though students of European politics emphasise that there are 
structural differences between Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe in terms 
of the nature and structure of party competition (Grzymała-Busse and Innes, 2003; Marks 
et al., 2006). We find that the EU Profiler performs better in terms of scaling reliability in 
Western European party systems than in Central and Eastern European party systems.  
We will first outline the construction of the EU Profiler. Then we will discuss how 
the difference between Western European and Central and Eastern European party 
systems may affect VAA design in the case of the EU Profiler. We subsequently examine 
the validity and reliability of the EU Profiler’s spatial models and test our expectation 
regarding East-West differences using party position data from the EU Profiler. The 
paper concludes with a set of recommendations derived from our analysis. 
2 EU Profiler design 
The EU Profiler provides voters with a political profile based on their responses to thirty 
statements on a five-point scale (EU Profiler Team, 2009b, p.4). By providing voters 
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with the responses of parties to these statements, they provide voters with information 
about “the intentions of the political parties running in the election” (EU Profiler Team, 
2009b, p.4). In developing the EU Profiler the team spent particular attention on 
statement selection, the coding of party positions and the different ways of representing 
these profiles.  
According to the EU Profiler team the “most critical aspect” of creating a VAA is the 
selection of statements (EU Profiler Team, 2009b, p.6). This is reflected in the literature, 
where Walgrave et al. (2009) emphasise that the selection of statements can greatly 
influence the advices of VAAs. Statements were selected on the basis of their relevance 
and ability to discriminate, and the comprehensiveness of the final selection. In order to 
meet the criterion of relevance, the EU Profiler team consulted party manifestos, opinion 
polls, journalists and academics to determine which issues were key in the election  
(EU Profiler Team, 2009b, p.6). The final selection included 28 statements used for all 
countries and 2 national (or regional) statements. In an unprecedented data collection 
enterprise 274 parties from 30 countries (of which two are divided into different regions) 
were placed on these issue statements, using a five-point scale (Trechsel and Mair, 2009, 
p.5). The EU Profiler triangulates parties’ positions on the statements, combining expert 
judgements, text analysis and party self-placement (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2007; Trechsel 
and Mair, 2009). 
After answering the statements, the EU Profiler user is guided to a webpage with his 
or her political profile (Trechsel and Mair, 2009, p.8). Here three different methods are 
offered to compare the voters’ profile to party profiles: the compass, the spider diagram 
and the match list. The first two are low-dimensional spatial models, constructed based 
on the idea “that opinions on individual issues can be aggregated to a limited number of 
issue dimensions” (EU Profiler Team, 2009b, p.13). Users are, however, advised that the 
compass and the spider diagram only provide a “simplified partial analysis”, because 
these do not include all statements (EU Profiler Team, 2009b, pp.14, 16).1 
The compass essentially is a two-dimensional spatial model, consisting of a left-right 
and a pro-anti EU integration dimension (EU Profiler Team, 2009b, p.14). The left-right 
dimension includes both economic issues (such as spending versus taxation) and cultural 
issues (such as support for same-sex marriage). The selection of dimensions is based on  
a priori considerations, although the designers do not provide an explicit reason for 
selecting these two dimensions. The EU Profiler team has decided before scoring parties 
to which dimension each statement belongs (EU Profiler Team, 2009b, p.13). The actual 
positions that parties or voters took on these issues do not play a role in this assignment.  
The second tool is the spider diagram, which was adapted from the Swiss smartvote 
(Trechsel and Mair, 2009, p.9). The spider diagram is a seven-dimensional representation 
of party and voter positions. These dimensions cover a wide range of policy areas from 
immigration to the environment. Again the selection of dimensions and the assignment of 
issues to the dimensions are based on a priori considerations and no justification is 
provided for the selection of dimensions.  
The third representation of the political profiles of voters is the match list, which is 
also used in many other VAAs. This simply displays the extent to which the voter and the 
party agreed with each other on all statements. It does not assume that party and user 
positions can be captured by a low-dimensional model.  
In the subsequent analysis we will focus on the compass and the spider diagram, 
because these representations make assumptions about the dimensionality of the political 
space. They are based on the notion that party and voter positions on several issues can 
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be aggregated in a low-dimensional political space (EU Profiler Team, 2009b, p.13). 
Parties, it is assumed, do not pick their issue positions at random, but there is an 
underlying low-dimensional space which structures party positions. The goal of this 
paper is to assess whether the dimensions used actually conform to the patterns 
underlying the answering patterns to the statements (scale reliability) and whether these 
dimensions conform to other estimates of party positions (convergent validity). 
3 A pan-European party space 
An important feature of the EU Profiler is that it allows one to compare one’s position to 
the position of political parties, not just from one’s own country, but also to parties from 
all over Europe. The compass and spider diagram are therefore based on the assumption 
that the positions of all parties in Europe can be aggregated into a single pan-European 
political space. Comparative research about the structure of political competition in 
Europe casts doubt on this possibility, in particular with reference to the difference 
between ‘old’ Western European democracies and the ‘new’ Central and Eastern 
European democracies (Evans and Whitefield, 1993; Grzymała-Busse and Innes, 2003; 
Tavits, 2005; Marks et al., 2006). There may be a difference between Western European 
democracies and Central and Eastern European democracies in the nature of party 
competition and the structure of party competition. 
There is a debate about the extent to which ideology matters in Central and Eastern 
European politics. Some argue that party competition in post-communist countries is not 
primarily structured by ideological differences (Grzymała-Busse and Innes, 2003). 
Parties had little room to differ in policy positions because they were bound by EU 
accession requirements, which lead parties to instead distinguish themselves by their 
capacity to govern (Evans and Whitefield, 1993; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Grzymała-Busse 
and Innes, 2003, p.64). More recent analyses, however, reveal that cleavages and issue 
dimensions do play a role in Central and Eastern European politics (Tavits, 2005; 
Whitefield et al., 2007; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). Still, it may be the case 
that in Central and Eastern Europe party competition is to a lesser extent structured by 
programmatic positions, while in Western Europe this extent is greater.  
Even when issue dimensions play a role both in Western as well as Central and 
Eastern Europe, the dimensionality of the party competition might be different in the old 
and new democracies. In particular, it has been argued that there is a structural difference 
between Western and Central and Eastern Europe in the relationship between the 
economic left-right dimension and the GAL/TAN dimension, which relates to lifestyle 
issues (Marks et al., 2006; Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009). In Western Europe left-wing 
parties tend to favour democratisation and libertarian policies and right-wing parties tend 
to be more traditionalist on moral issues and conservative about democratic reform. In 
Central and Eastern European countries the relationship is reversed: here left-wing 
parties tend to be more conservative (specifically unreformed or late reforming 
communist parties). The right tends to be more in favour of democratisation and 
extending individual liberties. In the transition from communism, the anti-system and 
pro-democratic parties were on the right, because they opposed the authoritarian,  
pro-system party, the Communists, which were on the left (Marks et al., 2006). Because 
of the communist transition political change in Central and Eastern Europe was 
inexorably linked to right-wing economic policies (Markowski, 1997; Kitschelt et al., 
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1999). The process of European integration has further reinforced the competition along 
a traditionalist left/libertarian right dimension (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009). Former 
communists, joined by left-leaning populist parties tend to oppose European integration. 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) find a similar two-dimensional structure in party 
competition. The EU Profiler, however, takes the socio-economic left-right and 
GAL/TAN dimensions together in a single left-right dimension. If, as we expect, the 
relation between these issue dimensions is different in Western than in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the model will perform poorly, in terms of scalability, at least in one half 
of the countries. 
Finally, European countries may differ in their national structures of political 
competition. There is great variation in the way that voters understand policy dimensions 
such as the left-right dimension, especially between countries (Klingemann, 1979). 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have pointed out that in Western European countries, specific 
historical circumstances brought about differences between the structures of competition. 
In some countries there is a centre/periphery dimension, while in others there is a 
religious/secular dimension. The historic development of these party systems explains 
these differences. Similarly, the differences between the political spaces in new 
democracies in the South of Europe as well as in Central and Eastern European countries 
have been explained by referring to country-specific historical and demographic factors 
(Evans and Whitefield, 1993; Evans and Whitefield, 1998; Kitschelt et al., 1999; 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009; Ramonaite, 2010). One should be cautious when 
integrating party positions from different European countries into one single model, 
because of these national differences. Other attempts to integrate parties from all over 
Europe into one measurement model of party positions have been contested because they 
lead to counter-intuitive results for specific cases (Warwick, 2002; Bakker et al., 2008; 
Dinas and Gemenis, 2009).  
All in all, there are reasons to be hesitant about integrating the positions of parties 
from all European countries in a single European political space. Compared to Western 
Europe positions of Central and Eastern European parties may be less coherent, there 
may be a structural differences between party competition in Central and Eastern Europe 
and Western Europe, or cross-national diversity. In the remainder of this paper we 
examine the validity and scaling reliability of the EU Profiler’s spatial models and study 
whether we do indeed find differences between East and West. 
4 Convergent validity 
One way to assess the extent to which models form a valid depiction of party positions is 
by examining to what extent the positions found cohere with other estimates of party 
positions. This notion of convergent validity has previously been applied to several 
VAAs by Wagner and Ruusuvirta (2012). They found strong relationships between 
parties’ left-right positions derived from VAAs and the party positions in expert surveys, 
but lower convergent validity for the issue dimensions concerning immigration and 
environment. Wagner and Ruusuvirta did not take the spatial models of VAAs into 
account. The question is thus whether their findings are also true for the EU Profiler’s 
estimates of party positions in political spaces. We compare these estimates with those 
from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) held in 2006 (Marks et al., 2007; Hooghe  
et al., 2010). We have selected this expert survey because it is the only one that includes 
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almost all countries covered in this study, it is specifically oriented towards European 
politics and it covers almost all issues included in the EU Profiler.2 The only exception is 
environmental protection (part of the spider diagram), where we used the Green-
Alternative-Libertarian/Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist variable as a proxy. We 
evaluate the relationship between the CHES and EU Profiler estimates of parties’ policy 
positions by means of the rank-order correlation (Spearman’s rho) as well as the absolute 
distance between both scores (Achen 1978; Wagner and Ruusuvirta, 2012). To calculate 
the absolute distance scores, we rescaled each of the dimensions to run from 0 to 1 and in 
the same direction. 
We start by assessing to what extent the dimensions in the EU Profiler’s compass 
relate with the left-right and pro/anti-EU integration dimensions from the expert survey 
(see Table 1). The rank-order correlation estimates on both dimensions are at least .64 for 
both Eastern and Western European parties. Furthermore, the absolute distance between 
the CHES and EU Profiler estimates of parties’ positions is relatively small, measuring 
0.10 to 0.14 on a scale that runs from zero to one. These results imply that the estimates 
from the compass are in general validated by these external measures. We expected the 
relationships between the expert survey and the compass estimates to be better in 
Western Europe than those in Central and Eastern Europe. We find some support for this 
assertion from the rank-order correlation coefficients, which are generally higher for the 
group of West European than for the Eastern European parties. However, the absolute 
distances between the EU Profiler and CHES scores are not significantly larger in 
Eastern Europe. This suggests that while in Western Europe on average there is a 
somewhat stronger relationship between the EU Profiler and CHES data, but also slightly 
more variance on most issues.3  
Table 1 Relationship between EU Profiler and Chapel Hill party position estimates 
 Spearman’s rho Absolute distances 
 East West East West 
Economic Liberalisation 0.54 0.80 0.14 0.16 
Environmental Protection 0.72 0.72 0.24 0.22 
Law and Order 0.47 0.74 0.17 0.14 
Left-Right 0.73 0.69 0.10 0.11 
Liberal Society 0.22 0.63 0.13 0.13 
Pro/Anti-EU 0.64 0.76 0.14 0.12 
Restrictive Financial Policy 0.80 0.88 0.11 0.14 
Restrictive Migration 0.66 0.70 0.15 0.17 
Welfare State Expansion 0.58 0.80 0.19 0.17 
Note:  Distances are the average absolute distances between party positions on the EU 
Profiler and CHES dimensions (both rescaled to run from 0 to 1). Western 
Europe includes the EU-15, Switzerland, Malta and Cyprus. Central and 
Eastern Europe includes the 12 new member states (excluding Malta and 
Cyprus) and the candidate countries. 
A similar observation holds for most of the dimensions included in the spider diagrams. 
For most issues in the spider diagrams there were good equivalents in the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey.4 The relationships between the spider diagram dimensions and the 
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corresponding dimensions from the expert surveys are generally strong for most 
dimensions (see Table 2). The liberal society dimension is most strongly related to the 
expert survey estimates. More moderate values of Spearman’s rho were found for the 
other dimensions. We shall argue below that these are also particularly problematic 
dimensions in terms of scaling reliability. The environmental policy dimension in the EU 
Profiler spider diagram relates particularly weakly to the expert scores. The average 
distance scores for both Eastern and Western European parties exceeds 0.2, twice the 
average distance on the left-right dimension. This is not unsurprising given the fact that 
the proxy that we used, the GAL-TAN dimension, did not only tap into environmental 
issues. Overall, the correspondence for the spider dimensions is slightly worse than for 
the dimensions in the compass. This is probably related to the fact that these dimensions 
were only measured by a few statements in the EU profiler (cf. Wagner and Ruusuvirta, 
2012).  
The estimates in the seven-dimensional spider diagrams and the two-dimensional 
compass are generally strongly (and significantly) related to the expert estimates. These 
models successfully meet the requirements of convergent validity. While correlations are 
generally somewhat higher for West European parties, we do not find a significant 
difference between the average absolute distances scores in Western and Eastern Europe.   
5 Scaling reliability 
The second criterion for a good measurement instrument is that the included items 
consistently tap into the same latent dimensions, or scaling reliability. This can be looked 
at in two ways. First, we can look at scaling reliability based on voters’ answers to the 
statements. Kleinnijenhuis and Krouwel (2009) have tested whether the models used by 
EU Profiler are an accurate reflection of the differences in voter positions. They 
identified five dimensions in the voters’ answers to the EU Profiler statements, rather 
than the compasses two or the spider diagram’s seven. This suggests that the EU 
Profiler’s models do not offer an accurate representation of the voter space. 
We use a different method to assess scaling reliability, which is based on parties’ 
positions. We examine the extent to which the items in the two-dimensional compass and 
the seven-dimensional spider diagram form consistent scales based on parties’ answers to 
the statements in the EU Profiler. The first aspect we examine is the extent to which the 
selected statements form a consistent scale. If items measure the same latent concept, this 
must be reflected in parties’ answering patterns. To explore the coherence of the 
answering patterns we use Mokken scaling. The goal of Mokken scaling is to develop an 
ordering of the items in such a way that if a subject ‘dominates’ a certain item he also 
dominates all items that are ranked lower (Niemöller and Van Schuur, 1983). In VAA 
terms this means that if a party agrees with a strongly progressive proposal, it should tend 
to agree with a moderately progressive proposal as well if the items are scalable. 
Mokken analysis produces estimates of three types of scalability coefficients. First, 
the extent to which the answer patterns of two items can be aggregated (item-pair 
scalability coefficients, Hij). Second, the extent to which one item fits in with all other 
items in the scale (item scalability coefficients, Hi). Third, the extent to which all items 
together form a consistent scale (scale scalability coefficient, H). In assessing the 
scalability we use the following benchmark values: below 0.3 (very poor), below 0.4 
(poor), below 0.5 (medium), below 0.6 (good), beyond 0.6 (very good).5 
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The first question is whether the structure that underlies the party positions can be 
modelled in terms of the two-dimensional pan-European party space of the compass.  
The Mokken Scaling analysis reveals a substantial difference between the left-right 
dimension and the pro- or anti-EU integration dimension (see Figure 1). The scalability 
coefficient for the left-right dimension is very poor (0.29), while for the pro- or anti-EU 
dimension scale it is very good (0.66). Thus we find support for the existence of a 
reliable pan-European dimension on European integration in the data, but the scalability 
of the items belonging to the left-right dimension is weak.  





0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0





0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
 
Note:  Lines indicate 95% standard errors for scalability coefficients from 100 
imputed datasets. This is thus only error derived from imputing missing values. 
The scalability of individual items can be examined by looking at their Hi-values  
(see Table 2). The items in the pro-/anti-European integration dimension form a coherent 
scale. The only item that does not fit well is the one on European taxation, which 
probably taps into both anti-European and anti-tax attitudes. The scalability coefficients 
of the items in the left-right dimension are much lower. Two items stand out: item 4 
concerning the skilled migrant workers and item 13 concerning the common agricultural 
policy. Neither of these items fits with the other items in the left-right dimension. The 
skilled migrant workers item proposes that “[im]migration policies oriented towards 
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skilled workers should be encouraged as a means of fostering of economic growth”  
(EU Profiler Team, 2009a). The EU Profiler compass assumes that right-wing parties and 
voters will tend to agree with this. Right-wing-oriented market-liberals may indeed 
support this policy, but right-wing anti-immigration conservatives will likely not do so. 
The agricultural statement suffers from a similar problem.  
Table 2 Scalability of items for dimensions in compass 
Dimension  Statement Hi 
Pro/Anti-EU 1 EU Taxes 0.543 
 2 Common Foreign Policy 0.709 
 3 Common Security Policy 0.646 
 4 European Integration 0.734 
 5 EU Membership 0.725 
 6 EU Parliament 0.604 
 7 National Vetoes 0.681 
Left-Right 1 Social Programmes 0.375 
 2 Healthcare Privatisation 0.323 
 3 Child Care Subsidies 0.268 
 4 Skilled Immigration -0.001 
 5 Restricting Immigration 0.338 
 6 Integration 0.378 
 7 Same-Sex Marriage 0.334 
 8 Religious Values 0.300 
 9 Decriminalisation of Soft Drugs 0.361 
 10 Euthanasia 0.292 
 11 Government Expenditure 0.354 
 12 Workers’ Protection 0.357 
 13 Common Agricultural Policy 0.011 
 14 Renewable Resources 0.342 
 15 Road Taxing 0.282 
 16 Global Warming 0.345 
 17 Civil Liberties 0.323 
 18 Punishment 0.402 
How does the scalability coefficient differ between Western Europe and Central and 
Eastern Europe? We repeated the Mokken scaling analysis of the two dimensions in the 
EU Profiler compass for West and East separately. We find that the scalability of both 
dimensions is higher in Western than in Central and Eastern Europe. When we analyse 
West European party positions we find an H-value for the left-right dimension of 0.35 
(poor scalability) and 0.73 for the pro/anti-European dimension (very good). If we look at 
exclusively at Central and Eastern European parties the H-value for the left-right 
dimension is extremely poor (0.18) while the scalability for the pro/anti-EU dimension  
is good (0.51). Both the European integration as well as left-right dimension fit 
considerably worse in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.  
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Contrary to our expectation, it does not appear to be the case that the reversed 
relationship between the economic left-right and the GAL/TAN dimension is the 
explanation of this. The EU Profiler compass assumes a ‘Western European’ relationship 
between cultural and economic policies – that is, right wing parties are expected to be 
conservative while left-wing parties are taken to be progressive. If we, however, reverse 
the direction of the GAL/TAN items in the EU Profiler left-right scale, we do not find an 
improvement of the scalability of items on the left-right scale. On the contrary, the 
scalability coefficient decreases to 0.00 for Central and Eastern European parties. Thus, it 
does not appear to be the case that this specific structural difference between Central and 
Eastern and Western Europe is the explanation for the lower level of scaling reliability in 
the Central and Eastern European countries. 
Figure 2 Scalability coefficients for dimensions in compass (country-level) 
 
Note: The grey dotted lines indicate a value of 0.3 for the H coefficient, which is 
generally regarded as the minimally accepted level. Data is presented in 
Appendix A. 
The final explanation for the East-West differences is that there are national differences 
in the dimensionality of the party systems. Figure 2 displays the scalability coefficient for 
each country separately on the two compass dimensions. Northern Ireland shows very 
high levels of scalability on both dimensions, while Lithuania fares very poorly. The 
dotted grey lines indicate the benchmark minimum level of scalability. A substantial 
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number of countries show adequate scalability of the European integration dimension, 
but poor levels of scalability on the left-right dimension – these countries are located in 
the top-left quadrant of Figure 2. These are mostly Central and Eastern European 
countries. In Western European countries the average H-value for the left-right 
dimension indicates a mediocre scale (0.41) and the EU integration dimension scales 
very well (0.62).6 In Central and Eastern Europe the average value indicates a very poor 
scale for the left-right dimension (0.14), while the pro-anti European dimension on 
average scales at a medium-level (0.45). It appears that the model fits particularly poorly 
within almost every Central and Eastern European party system. 
Figure 3 Scalability coefficients for spider diagram dimensions 
 
Note:  The dot indicates the H value for all countries, W = Western European 
countries, E = Central and Eastern European countries. 
An analysis of the spider diagrams point in the same direction: some clusters of items 
cohere strongly, some items do not fit well with the others and there are stark differences 
between European states (see Figure 3). If we analyse the seven different items for all 
parties, there are marked differences between the different dimensions in the spider 
diagram: the environmental protection dimension is the only one that forms a good scale 
(H > 0.5). The liberal society, law and order, and the welfare state dimensions score just 
below the 0.5 benchmark. The items for migration policy, economic liberalisation and 
financial policy all show poor levels of scalability. There are marked differences between 
Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe there are only three 
dimensions that fail to meet the medium base line, while in Central and Eastern Europe 
only two dimensions score above poor. It appears that even the more fine-grained spider 
diagram system cannot incorporate the differences between political parties in the whole 
of Europe.  
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How can we understand these patterns? Are the spider diagram and the compass 
models poorly specified, or is the poor scalability the result of a structural difference 
between Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe? We might be able to arrive at 
a more reliable model of party positions by means of an inductive analysis of parties’ 
answers to the VAA statements. We use multidimensional scaling (MDS) to see whether 
there are consistent patterns in the responses. This method looks at these differences in 
responses in terms of proximities (Kruskal and Wish, 1978).7 The goal is to construct a 
spatial model where parties with similar answers on the statements are placed closer to 
each other and far away from parties that respond differently. The badness-of-fit of an 
MDS model is expressed in terms of stress (Kruskal and Wish, 1978). The goal is to find 
a solution that has minimal stress. If a model falls below 10% stress one may fix it at that 
number of dimensions (Kruskal and Wish, 1978). Thus, MDS aims to find a low-
dimensional representation of parties’ diverging policy stances, without losing too much 
information. 
Figure 4 Stress for MDS solutions of party’s answers to EU profiler statements 
 
Note:  The grey lines indicate a stress level of 10%, which is usually regarded as the 
maximum level of stress for a solution to be regarded as adequate. Data is 
presented in Appendix B. 
The MDS analysis reinforces the point that the party space is different between countries 
(see Figure 4). It displays the stress levels of a one-, and two-dimensional (metric) MDS 
solution for each country.8 For some countries a one-dimensional solution suffices: 
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Northern Ireland, but also an Eastern European state such as Romania. For a larger group 
of countries a two-dimensional solution seems more appropriate. This includes both 
Western European and Central European countries, such as Austria and Slovakia. For 
several countries two dimensions do not suffice: the stress level for the two-dimensional 
solution is above 10%. This group includes countries from Eastern Europe and Western 
Europe such as France and Latvia. It consists mainly of countries with a relatively large 
number of political parties. It appears that there is no structural difference between 
Central and Eastern European countries and Western European countries in terms of 
dimensionality of the system. On average, modelling a Central and Eastern European 
system in terms of one-dimension gives more stress (25%), than modelling a Western 
European system (21%). This difference, however, is not significant. 
The analysis shows consistently that the differences between political parties in 
European countries cannot simply be aggregated into a pan-European model. These 
differences appear to be nationally bound: in some countries party positions on all issues 
can be modelled in terms of one dimension, in others three dimensions are necessary. 
While in general, there are marked differences between Central and Eastern Europe and 
Western Europe in terms of the extent to which they fit in the pan-European model, this 
is not based on a structural difference between the two regions. This finding casts doubt 
on the EU Profilers’ feature that enabled users to place themselves in a pan-European 
party space. A one-size-fits-all-approach does not actually fit the data. 
6 Conclusion 
The EU Profiler provides voters with information about their policy preferences in 
relation to those of political parties. It uses three distinct tools: the match list, the two-
dimensional compass and the seven-dimensional spider diagram. Here we assessed two 
aspects of two of these tools: the reliability and the validity of the compass and the spider 
diagram. We find that the models as a whole successfully pass the requirements of 
convergent validity: the party positions on the dimensions of the EU Profiler are mostly 
validated by data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. We also find, however, that many 
of the spatial models in the EU Profiler do not meet basic standards of model quality in 
terms of scalability.  
Part of these problems is caused by the fact that positions of parties from all over 
Europe are aggregated into one pan-European model. We found that there were strong 
differences between Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand and Western Europe on 
the other. While there is no discernible difference between the validity of party position 
in East and West, the Central and Eastern European EU Profiler models show lower 
levels of scaling reliability than Western European models, while there is also 
considerable variation between individual countries. 
This paper has presented an analysis of several aspects of the EU Profiler’s design. 
This does, however, not imply that there is nothing to like about the EU Profiler. On the 
contrary, in terms of the coding of party positions the EU Profiler presents a unique 
infrastructure and a detailed procedure of arriving at a decision on parties’ positions on 
statements. Every user can check what a particular position is based on, which is a good 
example of VAA professionalism and transparency. This transparency allows scholars  
of political science an unprecedented opportunity to compare patterns in political 
competition in European political systems. We hope that our comments may help to  
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even further improve upon the EU Profiler in particular and VAAs more generally. 
Therefore, we would like to translate our findings on the EU Profiler in four general 
recommendations for the use of spatial models in VAAs. 
First, makers of VAAs should be transparent about all their design choices. 
Compared to other VAAs, the EU Profiler does explain in quite some detail its statement 
selection procedure, party coding procedure and spatial models. We would, however, 
recommend that VAAs also discuss why they opt for a particular method of calculating 
the vote advices. 
If one chooses to use a low-dimensional representation of party and voter positions, 
one needs to consider the difference between a VAA based on party positions and voter 
positions. VAA makers should be aware that the voter space and the party space do not 
need to be identical: issues do not need to relate in the same way for voters as they do for 
parties. If the main goal is to give voters the best advice for the party that matches their 
preferences it seems most appropriate that the VAA’s underlying model is based on 
‘voter spaces’ in which parties are superimposed. If, however, the main goal is to provide 
information about the differences between the positions of parties, VAAs should be 
based on ‘party spaces’ in which the voter is superimposed.  
Moreover, in case a spatial model is used, users should also be able to find out how 
and why a particular set of dimensions is selected, what these dimensions mean and why 
these (and not others) matter. If the dimensionality is assumed a priori, VAA-makers 
should ensure that the statements used relate clearly to one of these dimensions and do 
not either measure attitudes on more than one dimension or tap into another substantive 
dimension. Currently, many VAAs do not make explicit how individual statements are 
assigned to issue dimensions. 
Last, if VAAs place parties from different countries or regions in one model, VAA-
makers should be aware of structural differences in the nature and the patterns of party 
competition between countries and regions. The creation of a supranational VAA should 
not be a goal in itself. We would expect some kind of argument whether it is possible and 
informative to compare these positions across borders.  
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Notes 
1 Not all items that the voter responded to are integrated into the compass or the spider diagram. 
The spider diagram does not include any item on European integration. No explanation is 
provided for this. 
2 Out of the 272 parties in the 2009 EU Profiler, 163 were included in the 2006 CHES. There 
are no estimates for non-EU members Croatia, Turkey and Switzerland in the CHES; 
additionally small countries (with few experts) such as Malta and Luxembourg are missing. 
Moreover, the CHES includes only parties that actually already had representation. Finally, a 
number of new parties emerged between 2006 and 2009.  
3 This assertion is supported by a multivariate error variance regression model in which the 
errors were modelled to depend on a party being East- or West-European (not reported). 
4 The liberal society spider diagram dimension was linked to the GAL/TAN dimension from the 
CHES; the restrictive financial policy dimension to the CHES tax versus spending question; 
the law and order dimension to civil liberties; the restrictive migration policy dimension to 
CHES migration question; the welfare state expansion dimension to the CHES income 
redistribution question; the economic liberalisation dimension to the CHES deregulation 
question. Only the environmental protection dimension had no equivalent in the CHES, 
therefore we used the GAL/TAN dimension as a proxy. 
5 We used Multiple Imputation (100 datasets) to estimate the missing values of the 28 items that 
were used across all countries (King et al., 2001). For the country-level statements the number 
of observations was too low to use Multiple Imputation; here we replaced missing values with 
the median value. 
6 Please observe that this is the mean scalability coefficient of West European countries, which 
is different from the scalability coefficient across all West European parties presented in 
Figure 1. 
7 A number of data reduction or scaling techniques can be used to analyse the dimensionality of 
the supply side of politics. We choose to use multidimensional scaling here, because it works 
quite well when the number of respondents (parties) is low. 
8 When using a non-metric analysis, stress levels will be somewhat lower in most countries  
and a two-dimensional solution will usually be adequate. However, the between-country 
differences are rather similar to the ones in the model presented in Figure 4. 
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Appendix A: Scalability of specific models 


































































































All States 0.296 0.665 0.467 0.202 0.485 0.343 0.560 0.479 0.244 
Western Europe 0.353 0.726 0.531 0.207 0.586 0.268 0.637 0.562 0.257 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 0.179 0.507 0.336 0.206 0.246 0.419 0.423 0.321 0.235 
Austria 0.518 0.719 0.938 0.439 1 0.019 0.281 1 0.519 
Belgium – Flanders 0.469 0.418 0.441 0.503 0.549 –0.043 0.375 1 0.311 
Belgium – Wallonia 0.339 0.457 0.391 0.59 0.82 –0.138 0.886 0.94 0.609 
Bulgaria 0.001 0.296 –0.032 0.436 –0.143 0.203 –0.077 0.807 0.405 
Croatia 0.182 0.334 0.638 –0.119 0.437 –0.072 1 –0.263 –0.082 
Cyprus 0.021 0.591 –0.094 0.054 –0.317 –0.086 0.478 0.163 0.043 
Czech Republic 0.150 0.758 0.123 0.53 0.022 –0.053 0.542 0.638 0.451 
Denmark 0.328 0.801 0.159 0.545 0.569 –0.015 0.899 0.795 0.531 
Estonia 0.325 0.480 0.333 0.301 –0.047 0.41 0.874 0.474 0.471 
Finland 0.209 0.954 0.494 –0.023 0.456 –0.01 0.673 0.448 0.039 
France 0.388 0.729 0.709 0.349 0.66 –0.144 0.475 0.524 0.264 
Germany 0.508 0.891 0.786 0.347 0.751 0.292 0.789 0.514 0.445 
Greece 0.363 0.388 0.822 0.069 0.831 0.552 0.65 –0.75 0.163 
Hungary 0.073 0.517 0.644 –0.023 0.673 0.614 0.023 0.284 0.043 
Ireland 0.367 0.185 0.651 0.017 0.652 0.276 0.663 0.947 0.182 
Italy 0.421 0.588 0.964 0.106 0.963 –0.199 0.761 0.724 0.355 
Latvia 0.240 0.102 0.186 0.222 0.308 0.683 1 0.429 0.256 
Lithuania 0.057 0.180 0.458 0.24 0.199 0.089 0.722 0.303 0.186 
Luxembourg 0.215 0.682 0.594 0.195 0.533 0.127 0.299 0.264 0.223 
Malta 0.469 0.696 0.392 –0.049 1 0.5 1 0 0.187 
Netherlands 0.367 0.453 0.559 0.223 0.577 0.036 0.923 0.289 0.403 
Poland 0.154 0.805 0.288 0.521 0.184 –0.108 –0.317 0.217 0.296 
Portugal 0.508 0.789 0.509 0.256 0.518 –0.039 0.053 0.703 0.343 
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Appendix A: Scalability of specific models (continued) 


































































































Romania –0.006 0.509 0.612 –0.074 0.476 0.626 0.388 0.045 0.078 
Slovakia 0.230 0.590 0.294 0.108 0.294 0.187 0.664 0.455 0.132 
Slovenia 0.277 0.648 0.401 0.405 0.571 –0.021 1 0.559 0.251 
Spain 0.442 0.280 0.558 0.101 0.609 –0.194 0.684 0.154 0.138 
Sweden 0.355 0.823 0.501 0.363 0.588 0.455 0.728 0.93 0.379 
Switzerland 0.629 0.592 0.787 0.497 0.868 –0.195 1 1 0.646 
Turkey 0.299 0.656 0.543 –0.046 0.409 0.252 1 0.172 0.051 
UK – England 0.499 0.798 0.647 0.387 0.726 –0.041 0.839 0.705 0.609 
UK – Northern 
Ireland 
0.779 0.964 0.705 0.171 0.729 1 1 0.515 0.399 
UK – Scotland 0.414 0.758 0.295 0.368 0.327 0.412 0.853 0.523 0.568 
UK – Wales 0.553 0.840 0.517 0.44 0.528 –0.025 0.878 0.731 0.649 
Appendix B: Stress of MDS models 
MDS stress 
Number of dimensions 
 
1 2 3 
Austria 10.505 2.171 0.467 
Belgium – Flanders 20.157 10.645 6.013 
Belgium – Wallonia 15.034 6.486 0.000 
Bulgaria 29.153 21.810 11.384 
Croatia 10.363 3.672 1.204 
Cyprus 23.157 2.682 2.347 
Czech Republic 44.012 10.856 7.303 
Denmark 21.406 6.803 3.385 
Estonia 17.996 10.196 5.574 
Finland 22.222 8.182 3.260 
France 39.865 17.251 8.053 
Germany 22.089 9.954 5.073 
Greece 22.205 2.647 1.770 
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Appendix B: Stress of MDS models (continued) 
MDS stress 
Number of dimensions 
 
1 2 3 
Hungary 12.990 6.173 1.358 
Ireland 27.114 3.842 0.725 
Italy 18.886 1.755 2.941 
Latvia 17.571 10.997 6.609 
Lithuania 30.084 22.172 11.474 
Luxembourg 11.489 10.297 4.864 
Malta 9.572 0.000 0.000 
Netherlands 35.689 21.384 4.970 
Poland 24.479 10.896 6.490 
Portugal 33.442 11.709 7.434 
Romania 6.264 6.045 0.000 
Slovakia 32.211 8.065 1.164 
Slovenia 27.376 10.726 4.176 
Spain 27.096 16.121 9.174 
Sweden 33.993 11.092 9.526 
Switzerland 11.622 2.376 1.117 
Turkey 38.279 14.178 4.731 
UK – England 12.629 3.783 0.039 
UK – Northern Ireland 6.704 0.000 0.000 
UK – Scotland 21.508 5.957 2.059 
UK – Wales 17.552 3.282 1.124 
 
